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Abstract
This paper extends Gertler￿ s (1999) tractable overlapping generations model
by allowing for imperfect labour markets and distortionary taxation. Further-
more, we allow for stochastic variation in demographic structure. The model is
then used to study demographic change in a small open economy of Finland.
The simulations highlight a key role played by labour market imperfections
in determining a ￿scal burden of ageing in de￿ned bene￿t pensions systems.
Higher labour market imperfections lead into considerably stronger responses
of labour supply and taxes on ageing. Thus, imperfections magnify the prob-
lem associated with ￿scal sustainability in ageing society. Stochastic simulations
suggest that lengthening of working time has rather minor impact on alleviat-
ing the ￿scal burden of ageing: Only a small fraction of stochastic variation in
endogenously determined contribution rate is explained by the stochastic vari-
ation in the length of working time. Variation in fertility rate is clearly much
more important.
1 Introduction
According to demographic trends, the old-age dependency ratio will almost double in
Finland during the next 30 years. This generates a formidable burden on the pension
system and long term ￿scal balance. Several calculations detecting direct costs of
ageing on ￿scal balance indicate that pension expenditures share to GDP could raise
roughly by 5 percentage points if the current pension system would prevail1. This
would mean that contribution rates would need to rise several percentage points in
order to fund the system.
Demographic aging will also lead to an increased expenditure on social welfare
and health care. Some estimates show that social services to elderly population
would double during the next 30 years. To the extent that these services remain
publicly funded and e¢ ciency gains remain moderate, the growth in the proportion
of elderly people will further increase the tax burden of the working-age population
and the public sector￿ s share of the national economy. In addition, in Finland,
additional tax burden on labour would be particularly detrimental for economic
growth, given that tax burden on labour is already now at a very high level in
￿An earlier version of this paper was presented at the European Central Bank in December 2005
and at the Annual Meeting of the Finnish Economists in February 2006. We are indebted for many
valuable comments from the participants and in particular, our discussant Mika Kuismanen at the
ECB. Usual disclaimer applies. Corresponding author: juha.kilponen@bof.￿
1See for instance Lassila (2005)
1international standards. The same applies to the size of the public sector in general.
In addition to direct e⁄ects on ￿scal balances, population ageing will have a number
of critical impacts also on economic activity. The most important is certainly the
e⁄ect on labour market.
To harness rather complicated and long-lasting e⁄ects of aging in the open econ-
omy like Finland, a comprehensive macroeconomic framework is needed. It should
use key pension parameters to map the main features of the pension system. In
addition, the e⁄ect of ageing on budgets and possible feedback a⁄ecting economic
activity from other ￿scal policy measures should be taken into account. In order to
achieve this, the Bank of Finland￿ s new dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic
model Aino has been enhanced by allowing for demographic transition arising from
ageing and by adapting the model to track the key features of the current pension
schemes.
Aino depicts the Finnish economy as dynamically optimizing small open economy
with an internationally given real interest rate and non-stochastic balanced growth
path. At balanced growth path, economic growth is determined by exogenously
given growth of labour saving technology and population. Accumulation of ￿nancial
assets and physical capital re￿ ect optimal intertemporal decisions of households and
￿rms. Optimal consumption and labour supply decision are based on Gertler (1999)
tractable overlapping generation model, and extended to allow distortionary taxes
and time varying retirement and death probabilities. Pensions are conditioned on
aggregate wage level and on demographic trend. Finally, given that Finnish pension
system is partially funded, we consider the funded part of the pension system as
contractual saving (assets accumulated by the pension fund) and the PAYG part
as a transfer from workers to pensioners. These transfers are ￿nanced by collecting
pension contributions from the ￿rms and the workers.
The results from various simulations highlight the key role played by taxation in
the assessment of the economic costs of an ageing population. When the responses
of labour supply, real wages and hence private consumption to higher taxation are
consistently accounted for, the economy settles at a level of taxation clearly above
that generally estimated in mechanical sustainability calculations. Even if the e⁄ec-
tive retirement age were to increase as expected, the burden from pension payments
alone would cause the tax rate to rise to a level above that witnessed in the worst
years of recession in the mid-1990s in Finland. In the light of the model calcula-
tions, the e¢ ciency losses induced by higher taxation due to demographic change
thus appear considerable.
In order to quantify the e⁄ects of uncertainty associated with demographic pro-
jection, we use stochastic simulations. Stochastic simulations suggest that there is
considerable uncertainty associated to economy￿ s reaction of demographic shocks in
the long run. The results suggest also that lengthening of working time has rather
minor impact on alleviating the ￿scal burden of ageing: Only a small fraction of the
stochastic variation in endogenously determined contribution rate is explained by
the stochastic variation in working period. Variation in fertility rate is clearly much
more important.
Rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview
to aging projections and pension system in Finland. Section 3 discusses the model,
including a description of the pension system in the model. Section 4-6 discusses the
results from various policy experiments including a sensitivity analysis and stochastic










      1980       1990       2000       2010       2020       2030       2040       2050
Old age dependency ratio,  65+ / (15 to 64) per thousands
Overall dependency ratio, (0 to 14 and 65+) / 15 to 64 per thousands
Old age dependency ratio,  60+ / (15 to 59) per thousands
Lähde: Statistics Finland.
Figure 1: Dependency ratios
2 Aging and pension system in Finland
2.1 Aging - long-run projections
Changes in the projected population structure in Finland up to 2050 are highlighted
in this section. Demographic trends and underlying assumptions are also discussed
using illustrations from key age cohorts identi￿ed by the model structure. Finally,
average pension scheme parameters are constructed on the basis of population pro-
jections broken down by relevant age cohort.
Population ageing is increasing the economic burden on the working age pop-
ulation. According to the latest population prognoses, the fastest growth in the
old age dependency ratio will take place in the 2020s and 2030s, when the baby
boom generation born after the second world war retires. After that, the ratio will
continue to grow at a slower pace. The overall dependency ratio gives a somewhat
less gloomy picture, since, the decreasing number of children resulting from the low
fertility rate to some extent o⁄sets the increase in life expectancy and the growth
in the number of retirees (1). The overall dependency ratio is projected to level o⁄
by the 2030￿ s. Immigration is forecast to remain insigni￿cant, at only about 5000
people a year on net basis. Finally, according to Statistics Finland estimates, the
life expectancy for men will grow from the current ￿gure of 75.1 year to 82.1 year
by 2040. For women the corresponding ￿gures are 81.8 and 86.8 years.
2.2 An overview of the pension system
The pension scheme in Finland is de￿ned bene￿t in the sense that pensions paid are
not directly dependent on contributions workers have made to employment pension
schemes or/and the yield of pension funds. Instead, rather than bene￿ts changing,
it has been the contribution rates that have moved in response to possible shortfalls
in the balance. If there has been a danger of the agreed funding rate not being
achieved, the level of contributions has been raised. The second general feature of
3the Finnish system is the negligible role of private and occupational pension schemes
of private ￿rms. Nearly all old age pensions are provided by employment pension
institutions or national pension institutions closely controlled by the state.
The latest reform, e⁄ective from the beginning of 2005, moved the pension system
in a more actuarial direction. With the introduction of a ￿ exible retirement age
of between 63 and 68, the level of pensions is being linked more explicitly than
before with exit age and thus with contributions made by the insured. Furthermore,
starting from 2009, changes in life expectancy will have an e⁄ect on pension levels.
In addition, pension indexation has been changed so that all pensions will be indexed
using a weight of 0.8 for living costs and 0.2 for wages where before a so called midway
index was applied up to age 65. This will contribute to a comparative erosion in
the value of pensions in compared to wage level. Contributions are collected from
employers and employees. Currently, on average 16.8% is collected from employers
and 4.6 % from the employees. Further changes in contribution rates have been
agreed to be shared equally (50-50) between employers and employees.
Due to the bene￿t based nature of the Finnish employment pension system,
long-term aggregate pension expenditure can be approximated simply from demo-
graphic factors and from the parameters determining average pension bene￿ts. The
most important factors are (naturally) demographic trends and the average age at
which people start to draw pensions - which together determine the total number of
pensioners. The average level of pensions is a⁄ected by wage levels and the pension
index and therefore consumption prices and productivity developments. In addition,
changes in life expectancy will have an e⁄ect on level of bene￿ts. In addition, the
replacement rate became dependent on exit age.
3 The model
3.1 General features
Aino depicts the Finnish economy as dynamically optimizing small open economy
with an internationally given real interest rate and non-stochastic balanced growth
path. At balanced growth path, economic growth is determined by exogenously
given growth of labour saving technology and population. Accumulation of ￿nancial
assets and physical capital re￿ ect optimal intertemporal decisions of households and
￿rms. A special attention has been devoted in the modelling of optimal consumption
and labour supply decision such that the demographic change can be dealt with, yet
maintaining an analytical tractability.
Households￿saving decisions, and thus accumulation of ￿nancial assets, are in-
￿ uenced by households￿desire to smooth consumption over time. Individuals are
expected to have ￿nite lives which consist of two distinct periods. We label the
households living in these two di⁄erent periods as ￿ workers￿and ￿ retirees￿ , as in
Gertler￿ s (1999).2 In order to capture changing labour supply incentives of elderly,
we assume that the ￿ retirees￿participate in the labour markets. However, in compar-
ison to workers, their labour e¢ ciency is lower. Lower labour e¢ ciency can capture
issues such as part-time work and possibly lower productivity. In more general,
elastic labour supply allows demographic change to feed into adjustment of capital
and investment throught capital-labour substitution e⁄ect.
2Also Keushnigg (2004) has analysed the ageing in Austria using a variant of the Gertler (1999)
model.
4The likelihood that the worker may lose part of his labour income due to re-
tirement, induces her to discount the future income stream at higher rate than
otherwise. This reduces consumption and increases saving. In this sense, workers
save for a rainy-day and retirement. This view is consistent with the study of Gour-
inchas and Parker (2002), who ￿nd that empirically observed saving patterns are
in accordance with forward-looking optimizing behavior in a life-cycle setup with
income uncertainty. Their study suggest that precautionary saving motive in early
life implies that between 60-70 percent of non-pension wealth is due to precaution-
ary saving. Finally, the planning horizon of pensioners is shorter than workers￿due
to the constant periodic probability of death. Therefore, in the model, pensioners￿
propensity to consume out of wealth is greater than that of the working-age popu-
lation. Gourinchas and Parker (2002) estimate marginal propensity to consume out
of liquid assets of 6-7 percent to retirees.
Individuals receive transfers from both the central government as well as from
pension funds, following the general features of the social security system of Finland.
In order to maintain analytical tractability and ease computational burden of the
simulations, however, pensions are related to prevailing aggregate wage level, and
not an individual characteristics. Other transfers are treated as lump sum. Given
that Finnish pension system is partially funded, we consider the funded part of
the pension system as contractual saving (assets accumulated by the pension fund)
and the PAYG part as a transfer from workers to pensioners. These transfers are
￿nanced by collecting pension contributions from the ￿rms and the working age as
discussed above.
Supply side (production structure) is based on CES -production technology with
factor augmentation in the underlying technological progresses and nominal and
real rigidities. The model is closed by ￿scal rules. Given that we separate between
central government and the pension fund, one ￿scal rule determines the pension
fund￿ s long-term net lending rate, while the other determines the central government
￿ debt ratio￿ .
3.2 Demographics
Consumers are assumed to be borne as workers.Conditional on being a worker in the
current period, the probability of remaining one in the next period is !t; while the
probability of retiring is 1￿!t. . These transition probabilities are independent on
individuals￿employment tenure, so that average tenure of working is 1
1￿!t. In order
to allow for non-stationary demographic structure, we subindex the probabilities by
t: Once an individual has retired she is facing a periodic probability of death (1￿￿t).
Given that the survival probability ￿t is assumed to be independent of retirement
tenure, but that it may depend on calendar time, the average retirement period at
each point of time is 1
1￿￿t:
Let Nw
t denote the stock of worker alive at time t: We then assume that ￿
1 ￿ !t+1 + nw
t+1
￿
new workers are born in t + 1: This implies that the working
age population grows at the gross rate of 1 + nw
t :
Nw
t+1 = (1 ￿ !t+1 + nw
t+1)Nw
t + !t+1Nw




t+1 = 1 + nw
t+1: Given constant probabilities of retirement and death and
that cohorts are large, retiree population (Nr
t ) evolves according to
Nr




t refers to stock of retiree population at time t. With some manipulations,



















De￿ning a stock of whole population as Nt = Nw
t + Nr
t ; we can express the growth
rate of whole population as a function of retiree to worker ratio and growth rate of














Notice also that retiree population grows with gross rate
^ Nr
t+1 = (1 ￿ !t+1)’￿1
t + ￿t+1 (3.5)
In the steady state the demographic change has ended and so we have that
’ =
1 ￿ !
^ N ￿ ￿
(3.6)
^ N = ^ Nw = ^ Nr (3.7)
In contrast to large scale overlapping generations models, such as Auerbach-
Kottliko⁄ (1987) we do not follow individual cohorts within the two age groups.
This limits our ability to model the demographic change and pension system in very
detailed manner. We also need to abstract from many other potential sources of
heterogeneity in consumption and labour supply behavior. However, we can still
specify the retirement and death probabilities as well as the growth rate of working
age population in such a way that demographic transition can be captured at rea-
sonable accuracy in the aggregate level. Similarly, linking pensions to demographics,
we can roughly mimic the associated trends in pensions and public expenditures. Fi-
nally, allowing deterministic trends in retirement and death probabilities, allows us
to generate demographic ￿shocks￿that feed into dependency ratio gradually, rather
than instantly. Deterministic trends in retirement and death probabilities have been
consistently dealt with when deriving the ￿rst order conditions, as discussed below.
3.3 Households
3.3.1 Preferences
Households￿preferences are expressed recursively using the constant elasticity ag-
gregator
Vt = [fu(Ct;lt)g





Vt is the value function ￿ gives subjective time preference. The parameter ￿c < 1
captures intertemporal subsitution. A special case of ￿ = 1 applied here, corresponds
to a type of risk neutrality, where the agents are indi⁄erent regarding risk, but still
maintaining a non-trivial preference for the time at which consumption occurs (cf.
6Farmer (1990)).3 This special case is analytically tractable, since it generates linear
decision rules even with (idiosyncratic) risk to income, asset return and length of life.
In addition to risk neutrality and recursive structure of the preferences, we assume
that individuals enjoy utility from consumption Ct as well as leisure according to
following utility functional
u(Ct;lt) = Cv
t (1 ￿ lt)1￿v (3.9)
Taking into account the two distinct periods of life as well as retiring and death






v (1 ￿ lz
t)1￿v]￿c + ￿z[Et(Vt+1jz)]￿c￿ 1
￿c (3.10)
where
Et(Vt+1jw) = !tV w
t+1 + (1 ￿ !t)V r
t+1; ￿w = ￿ (3.11)
Et(Vt+1jr) = V r
t+1; ￿r
t = ￿￿t: (3.12)
z = w;r indicates whether the individual is worker or retired with obvious notation.
Cz
t is consumption and 1 ￿ lz
t denotes leisure. Thus, lz
t denotes the fraction of time
allocated to work. v is the elasticity of the period utility with respect to consumption,
while ￿c captures the intertemporal curvature of the preferences. The willingness to
smooth consumption over time implies a ￿nite (constant) intertemporal elasticity of
substitution ￿ = 1=(1 ￿ ￿c): The retirees e⁄ective discount factor ￿r is adjusted to
take into account periodic probability of death.
We assume perfect annuities market in order to eliminate the impact of uncer-
tainty about time of death: Remaining wealth that retirees hold at the time of death
are invested in mutual fund which in turn invests them in available ￿nancial assets
at each period of time. Those surviving to the following period receive a return that
is proportional to his contribution to the fund. For instance, if Rt is the gross return
per unit invested by the fund, the gross return for a surviving retirees is Rt=￿t at
time t:
Workers, in turn, faces a potential risk of a decline in wage income. However,
since individual￿ s preferences are over the mean of next period￿ s value function, only
a desire the smooth consumption over time a⁄ects on consumption pattern in the
face of idiosyncratic income risk. Thus, a worker simply forms a certainty equivalent
of his random utility as shown in equation.4(3.11).
Both retirees and workers consume and save out of income derived from ￿nancial
assets, labour and transfers received from the public sector. Given speci￿c assump-
tions regarding preferences and population dynamics, there is no need to keep track
on that how assets and consumption are distributed among retirees and workers.
Since marginal propensities to consume are the same for each individual within
the two groups, we can simply aggregate by summing across individuals within the
3Since ￿c is bounded above by 1, it follows that the risk-neutral decision maker prefer late
resolution of uncertainty (for details see Kreps and Porteus (1978)).
4Assumption of risk-neutrality is important. For instance, analysis of welfare e⁄ects of social
security reforms are importantly a⁄ected by the consideration of risk. Mandatory social security
system imposes an implicit tax on the households so that there is a reduction in expected life-
cycle income (due to social security contributions). However, if social security system reduces the
variance of life-cycle income by pooling the income risk between young and old generation, there is
potentially a trade-o⁄between a reduction in expected life-cycle income and the variance: Reduction
of welfare due to mandatory social security would then be lower for risk-averse households than for
risk-neutral ones.
7groups. However, since marginal propensities to consume out of wealth di⁄er be-
tween the two groups, we must keep track on how ￿nancial assets are distributed
between workers and retirees: aggregate private consumption, which is a sum of
consumption of workers and retirees will depend upon evolution of this wealth dis-
tribution.
3.3.2 Retirees
A retiree born at time j and retired at time k, and who survive at least until t + 1














































pensions and ￿ < 1 is labour e¢ ciency of retirees with respect to workers5. Pc
t is a
price index of consumption to be determined later on. From the ￿rst order condition













Solving the retiree￿ s maximization problem with respect to consumption, using










t denote discounted after tax values of labour income and pensions and
￿t￿t is retirees marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. More speci￿cally
Hr
















Since the total social security payments (pensions) are distributed equally among
retirees gross growth rate of retirees ^ Nr
t+1 enters into the discount factor. Discount
factor of human wealth is similarly augmented ^ Nr
t+1. Notice that in the steady
state ^ Nr
t = ^ N: Retirees marginal propensity to consume out of wealth ￿t￿t evolves































t . The retirees marginal propensity to consume varies with real
interest rate Rt+1= ^ Pc
t+1 as well as with expected changes in real net wage income.
Due to the fact that survival probability can vary over calendar time, it in￿ uences
on retirees e⁄ective discount rate and introduces additional dynamics into marginal
propensity to consume equation.
As in standard Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) models, likelihood of death
(1 ￿ ￿t) in (3.18) raises the retirees￿marginal propensity to consume. This can be
seen easily by considering a limiting case of logarithmic preferences (￿ ! 1) and
when survival probability is constant. In this case
￿￿ = 1 ￿ ￿￿ (3.19)
3.3.3 Workers










v (1 ￿ lws







t + (1 ￿ tWS
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t denotes ￿nancial transfers to working age, tWS
t is worker￿ s labour income tax
rate and tWP
t is pension contribution rate. First order condition for labour yields











Intertemporal maximisation in turn gives rise to a rather complicated Euler







￿t is worker￿ s marginal propensity to consume and Hw
t and Sw
t denote human and so-
cial security wealth correspondingly. Marginal propensity to consume out of wealth

























t is statutory tax rate on wage income of the workers, tWP
t is pension
contribution rate and ￿t+1 is the factor that weights the gross real return Rt+1= ^ Pc
t+1.























t+1 is statutory tax rate paid by the retirees and ￿t+1 > 1is a ratio of marginal
propensity to consume of the retirees to that of the workers.
9Hw
t in (3.23) is a discounted sum of the wage bill of workers (in net terms) and
Sw
t is the sum across workers alive at t of the capitalised value of social security
(in net terms). Both of these measures take into account corresponding discounted







































































t+1 measures the aggregate value of human wealth for the working retiree
who retired at time t+1, but was still working at time t. Similarly, S
rj(t+1)
t+1 measures
the value of total social security for the retiree, who retired at time t + 1; but was
still working at time t. A factor ^ Nw
t+1 augments the discount rate of the capitalised
value of social security for the workers because with ￿nite lives, a share of total
social security entitlements of those currently alive declines over time as working
age population grows. By similar argument, ^ Nw
t+1 enters into the discount factor of
human wealth. Moreover, notice that in the limiting case of logarithmic preferences
(￿ ! 1) marginal propensity to consume is constant, and it depends only on discount
rate ￿:
￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ (3.28)
Enlarged discount rate due to presence of ￿t+1 > 1 in the denominator of (3.26)-
(3.27) means that workers value the human wealth and social security less relative
to in￿nite horizon case. This in turn has a tendency to reduce working age individ-
ual￿ s consumption and increase saving. Importantly, distortionary taxes similarly
increase the workers￿discount factor. This factor is also useful when assessing the
importance of various channels of making the model depart from Ricardian equiva-
lence assumption. Both distortinary taxes and ￿nite lenght of life makes ￿ large and
correspondingly make the model "less Ricardian". This can be seen most easily by
looking at the steady state value of ￿ in the special case where retirees and workers










3.4 Distribution of wealth and aggregate consumption
Workers and retirees di⁄erent marginal propensities to consume are re￿ ected in the
rate at which the two groups accumulate ￿nancial assets. Aggregate consumption
10then depends on how ￿nancial assets are distributed among the two groups. Conse-









At+1 be the share of
￿nancial assets held by the workers. It can be shown that retirees share of ￿nancial
wealth evolves according to:
￿r





















Aggregate private consumption can then be obtained simply by summing up





At+1 and remembering that all the assets are even-
tually held by the domestic consumers:
Pc
t CH
t = ￿t ([(1 ￿ ￿r
t)RtAt + Hw
t + Sw




Equation for aggregate consumptions shows that transfers in￿ uence markedly on
the evolution of the distribution of wealth, which in turn in￿ uences on aggregate
consumption. Labour income taxes in￿ uence on consumption directly via the mea-
sures of human wealth and income transfers, but also indirectly through its e⁄ect
on labour supply and distribution of assets between retirees and workers.
3.5 Assets
There are di⁄erent ￿nancial assets available for consumers : domestic government
bonds AS
t , foreign bonds AW
t and stocks issued by the domestic ￿rms AF
t . In addi-
tion, it is assumed that all the assets accumulated by the pension fund A
p
t are hold
by the domestic consumers.
The domestic one period bonds pay a nominal return rt; while the gross return
of stocks is determined according to the pro￿ts of the ￿rms in the model. Foreign
bonds pay a return rF
t ; which is exogenously given. Arbitrage condition equates ex
ante returns of domestic and foreign bonds yielding to a standard Uncovered Interest
Rate Parity (UIP) condition. The share price is the nominal price (ex-dividend) of
a unit of equity in period t. The factor de￿ning the gross return of stocks is the
pro￿ts of the ￿rms ￿D
t in the model. This gross return is de￿ned as follows
1 + rD
t = [AF





t denotes corporate tax rate. Optimal consumption plans can be combined
with the arbitrage equation for holding di⁄erent assets. This gives the two equations
that relate after tax interest rates to each other
rD
t = rS
t (1 ￿ ￿S









St is nominal exchange rate, rS
t denotes domestic short-term nominal interest rate
and rF
t denotes corresponding foreign short term interest rate. tS
t is tax rate at
source. The latter is a standard UIP condition. In addition to this, we assume an
exogenously determined risk-premium kt between domestic bonds and stocks issued
by the domestic ￿rms.
113.6 Labour Markets
The model features nominal wage rigidity in a form of Calvo pricing so that only a
fraction of workers can re-set their wage in each period. For those not being able
to optimise in period t, the wage is adjusted using the steady state growth rate of
wages. This steady state growth rate is denoted by w￿ g and it equals steady state
productivity growth plus in￿ ation. Behavior of aggregate nominal wages is then

















(1 ￿ q)￿w￿ g
(1 + ￿(1 ￿ q)2w￿ g2)
EtWt+1 +
(1 ￿ q)w￿ g
(1 + ￿(1 ￿ q)2w￿ g2)
Wt￿1 (3.36)
+
q(1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿w￿ g2)





t is consumption of workers, Nw
t is worker population and Lw
t denotes
labour demand of workers q 2 (0;1) is exogenous (Calvo) probability that deter-
mines how often randomly chosen worker is allowed to re-set her wage. tWS
t denotes
labour income tax rate of working age population and tWP
t denotes pension contri-
bution rate. Equation for optimal wage W￿
t is directly derived from the aggregate
version of worker￿ s labour supply decision.6
Given that workers￿and retirees￿labour e¢ ciency di⁄er, we de￿ne aggregate




Here ￿ 2 (0;1) denotes the relative e¢ ciency of a unit of retirees￿labour. Labour
demand for workers Lw
t is derived from (3.38) by assuming that retirees are always on
their labour supply curve at prevailing wage (W), and that the domestic intermediate
goods producer is always on its labour demand curve. In solving the steady state
version of the model, the labour demand/supply indices presented above are made
stationary by scaling them with Nt; while wages are scaled by labour augmenting
technical change ￿L
t and numeraire price level Pt; to be determined later on.
6Imperfect, non-competitive features for the labour markets can be introduced by assuming that
each intermediate goods ￿rm uses CES combination of di⁄erentiated types of workers. Their labour














t (j)denotes the demand of type j worker. Cost minimisation implies that the demand of













1+￿L is elasticity of substitution among di⁄erentiated labour inputs. Wt(j) denotes wage
















t ; where mrs
w
t is marginal rate of substitution between con-
sumption and leisure and ￿
￿1
L is wage mark-up.
123.7 Public sector
The general government (public sector) is divided into two sectors, labeled as a
state (central government) and pension funds. The state collects taxes from labour
income at rate tWS
t , tRS
t , from capital gains at rate tK
t and from consumption at rate
tC
t . The state consumes CS
t and pays both taxable and non-taxable income transfers
to workers and to retirees. In the budget constraint the total transfers are denoted
by T S
t : In addition, the state issues one period government bonds AS
t that pays a








t (income tax revenues)
+ tK











t (total net transfers)
￿ rtAS
t￿1 (interest payments) (3.39)
3.8 Fiscal policy rule and ￿scal response - a little detour
In order generate realistic response of the model to government spending shock,
￿scal policy rule, together with the assumptions on price and wage imperfections
are of crucial importance. Standard DSGE models build on New Keynesian tradition
typically predict a strong negative response of private consumption to government
spending shocks. This is typically due to the negative wealth e⁄ect which induces
households increase their labour supply and cut private consumption. By an large,
however, the empirical literature shows that government spending shocks have a
positive or, at least, only moderate negative e⁄ect on private consumption7.
In the Aino model, negative wealth e⁄ect of government consumption is reduced
at least by two factors. First, when the government spending shock is modelled
through increase in public purchases of private goods, assumption of imperfect com-
petition generates aggregate demand externality. Subsequent increase in output and
pro￿ts then dampens the negative wealth e⁄ect. Second, non-Ricardian households
and relatively high discounting due to ￿nite lives, makes the current consumption
track current disposable income by more than in the standard "Ricardian econ-
omy". Consequently, both imperfections and ￿nite lives of the households poten-
tially dampen the strong negative wealth e⁄ect of government spending.
Beside the above mentioned features, the short and medium run impact of, say,
government spending shock on private consumption in the model with non-Ricardian
features crucially depend on how much the real wages react on ￿scal impact and the
degree of debt ￿nancing8. The degree of debt ￿nancing, in turn, is controlled by the
￿scal rules in the models like this.
7Fata·s and Mihov 2001, Mountford and Uhlig 2001, Canzoneri et al. 2002, Perotti 2002, Gali
et al. 2004.
8Real wage response is important because more negative response of real wage strengtheness a
negative wealth e⁄ect of a government spending shock. Empirically, it has been suggested that the
real-wage response to government spending shocks is rather small (Fata·s and Mihov 2001).
13Typically, the models like this are closed either by a tax rule or by a lump
sum transfer rule. We use a rather general form of a tax rule that stabilizes the
evolution of government debt through labour income tax. Formally, the tax rule




t￿1 ￿ ￿ ￿ws) + ￿2(AS
t ￿ ￿ AS)=Yt (3.40)
The tax rule has two attractors ￿ ￿ and ￿ AS=Yt towards which the tax, and conse-
quently the debt to output ratio are stabilised. The rule has a feature by which ￿scal
spending shock generates realistic paths for debt to output ratio and labour income
taxes as observed in the Finnish data. Benchmark values for the parameters ￿1 and
￿2 have been calibrated to 0.3 and 0.1 respectively. ￿ ￿ and ￿ AS=Y has been set such
that the public debt to output ratio reach wanted steady state values. Because taxes
are distortionary in the model, this way of closing the model, however, decreases the
impact multiplier of government spending shock.
In order to illustrate this, ￿gure 2 shows how the model reacts to government
spending shock, here modelled as a shock to lump sum transfers to the households.
In a benchmark simulation (red, solid line), aggregate consumption reacts mildly
positively at the beginning but is quickly cut back so that after a one year private
consumption is already negative relative to its steady state value. Positive impact
of private consumption at the beginning is solely due to the fact that it succeeds
stimulating only the retirees consumption. Their increase consumption by 0.8 %
as a response to one percentage point increase in government spending. Worker￿ s
reaction to spending shock is negative from the beginning, as real wage increase is
not enough to compensate expected surge in taxes.
Dynamic response paths look very di⁄erent when we assume a very slow ￿scal
adjustment (blue, dashed line). Slow ￿scal adjustment increases markedly the degree
of debt ￿nancing, thus generating less tax distortions through the labour markets.
Furthermore, given that workers (and retirees) discount future income streams at
higher rate than at which government can borrow, ￿scal policy that postpones taxes
into the future boosts up consumption in the short-run. This makes the model
clearly less Ricardian. Both these features are clearly illustrated in a moderate and
prolonged positive response of workers￿consumption to ￿scal stimulus. The fact
that retirees￿consumption response is less a⁄ected by a slower ￿scal adjustment
shows how the distorting e⁄ect of taxes through the labour markets play a crucial
role in determining the e⁄ectivenes of ￿scal stimulus to the economy. Finally, in
both simulations an investment crowding out is visible, yet rather moderate in the
latter case.
3.9 Statutory pension fund
There are several motivations to consider the pension fund(s) separate from the
central government. First, when the pension scheme is de￿ned bene￿t and partly
funded, we should consider the funded part of the pension system as contractual sav-
ing, as opposed to discretionary saving, while the PAYG part should be considered as
a direct transfer from young generation (workers) to old generation (pensioners)10.
9See for instance Railavo (2004) for the discussion on alternative ￿scal policy rules and their
stability properties.
10In Finland, approximately 25% of the pensions are funded.















































































Figure 2: Dynamic responses to a government spending shock (transfers).
Note: This ￿gure depicts the dynamic responses of the economy to a persistent
government spending shock modelled as a lump sum transfer to households. The
parameter governing the degree of persistence of a shock is set equal to 0.85. Both
workers and retirees receive a transfer that is proportional to their relative shares
in the population. Dynamic responses are depicted as deviations from the steady
state, either in percentage or in percentage point terms as appropriate. Demographic
structure is kept unchanged along the transition paths. Slow ￿scal adjustment refers
to the case where ￿1 = 0:5 and ￿2 = 0:05:
15In Finland, where approximately 25% of the pensions are funded both features are
quantitatively important
Second, pension contributions are considered, at least partly, taxes. Analogously
with the previous section, this means that the way in which increasing ￿scal burden
of aging is ￿nanced along demographic transition path is of crucial importance as
regards to labour market responses of the economy to aging. The trade-o⁄is clearly
as to what degree demographic transition is ￿nanced by changing the pension fund￿ s
asset position or by changing the contribution rates.11
Accordingly, we thus assume that the pension funds in the economy are admin-
istrated separately from the central goverment. The fund collects pension contri-
butions from the private sector12 as well as distributes pensions to retirees T PR
t .
Pension funds accumulate ￿nancial assets AP
t . In each period, therefore, the follow-





t WtLt (social security contributions of employer and employee) (3.41)
￿ T PR






t is overall pension contribution rate, consisting of employer
and employee contributions. Finally T PR
t denote pensions and other transfers from
pension funds to retirees.
3.10 Contribution rule
Inter-generational distribution of ￿scal burdens related to ageing is not actively man-
aged by institutional controls built into current pension schemes. According to Fenge
and Werding (2003) "it merely just happens". Consequently, inter-generational dis-
tribution is hardly an issue when devising the contribution rule for the model like
this. At the same time, however, the contribution rule should be made ￿ exible, yet
realistic enough to study alternative demographich scenarios and make policy ex-
periments. As discussed earlier, in Finland the contribution rate has been adjusted
so as to maintain the pension fund￿ s ￿scal balance. In fact, the pension funds net
lending relative to aggregate wage sum has been rather stable during the last 25
years (sample mean is 0.07). Given this, the contribution rule should stabilise the
net lending to aggregate wage sum to some predetermined level in the long run while
maintaining a close but not a perfect relationship between contribution rate and ra-
tio of pensions to wage sum . Consequently, we write a simple "net lending" rule
11Third important consideration is that pension funds hold the savings for the households that are
completely illiquid. Households are thus not able to borrow, or at least only a very limited amount,
against their savings accumulated in the pension funds. This means that households do not see
pensions accumulated to the pension funds as perfect substitutes for more liquid forms of saving,
such as bonds and equity. This is supported by the ￿ndings from empirical literature according to
which a growth in partially funded pension schemes does boost personal saving, but not one-to-one.
In the model￿ s economy pension fund￿ s assets are considered as part of the household￿￿nancial
wealth that yield the same return as government bonds. Thus the current version of the model does
not address the issue related to imperfect substitutability between private savings and contractual
saving to the pension fund.
12It may also consume C
P
t and invests I
P
t and received small transfers T
SP
t from the state in
each period. These are small items in the national accounts however, so we ignore them.








+ ￿ AP) (3.42)
where ￿ AP is the target rate for net lending to wage sum and ￿3 is a adjustment
parameter. This form is ￿ exible enough so that alternative policy experiments can
be generated. For instance setting ￿ AP to zero and ￿3 large implies pure PAYG
system. In our benchmark simulations, we set ￿ = 0:15 and ￿ AP = 0:07.
3.11 Pension expenditures
Allowing idiosyncratic history dependence in social security13 and pension payments
would make the model perhaps more realistic, but at the same time, we would
loose analytical tractability. However, we can link the model￿ s pension expendi-




where ￿t = ￿ et= ￿ W is average pension rate evaluated at initial steady state level of
aggregate wages ￿ W. Since in the model wage rate Wt is endogenous, we obtain
projections for pension expenditures once we set a deterministic path to average
pension rate ￿t. Total pension expenditures T R
t are thus linked to average wages
and number of pensioners in the model. Making use of our demographic assumption,

















Since Wt is endogenous the pension expenditures have a tendency to react too












t￿1 + (1 ￿ ￿p)Wt (3.47)
WP
t is now a pension wage, which reacts only slowly to changes in aggregate
wage during the demographic transition. The speed at which pension wage reacts
to aggregate wage is governed by autoregressive parameter ￿p: With this formula-
tion, we can roughly mimic the dependence of pension expenditures per capita on
aggregate wage levels.
13Regarding transfer to working age, we keep them independent of demographic structure. Simi-
larly we assume no changes in government consumption, although in more realistic scenarios, aging
may have implications to these aswell.
173.12 Production sector
The Aino model builds on the tradition of a neoclassical growth model. The tech-
nical progress is labour augmenting in the balanced growth path. Persistent, but
temporary, growth and slump periods may exist due to shifts in capital-augmenting
technical change.
The supply side is based on a single intermediate good that can be used in the
production of ￿nal goods. Producers of this intermediate goods combine capital
and labour using constant-elasticity-of- substitution (CES) production function and
operate in monopolistic product markets. Prices of ￿nal goods are sticky in the
form of Calvo-pricing. Domestic producers of intermediate products purchase their
capital inputs (capital services) in a competitive capital market (from companies
providing capital services) in which capital is freely for sale and transferable for use
by other companies. Building up new capital generates cost ￿ adjustment costs ￿
in the form of lost capital stock.
Domestic intermediate goods are combined with the imported intermediate goods
to produce ￿nal goods of three kinds: consumption goods, capital goods and ex-
ported goods. The production function ￿ or, rather, aggregator ￿ is CES. The
production of ￿nal goods di⁄er in terms of elasticity of substitution. All three types
of ￿nal producers operate in competitive product markets in which they take the
market price for their products as given in their own decision-making.
Finally, nominal import prices are assumed to be sticky in a manner correspond-
ing to domestic intermediate goods prices. It is also assumed that, in the short
term, exchange rate pass-through to import prices is incomplete. This is due to the
fact that a ￿xed fraction of importing companies price their products in the local
currency.
3.12.1 Domestic intermediate goods producer
The domestic composite intermediate good, Yt, is produced according to the fol-
lowing constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function that combine









The parameter ￿z 2 [￿1;1) determines the elasticity of substitution 1=(1 + ￿z).


















Domestic intermediate goods, Yt(j), are produced by producers who face monop-
olistic competition. The production technology and the factor augmenting technical
18trends are exogenously given. The production function is of the CES type and it



















t denote time-varying15 capital and labour-augmenting technical
progress respectively. The elasticity of technical substitution is given by 1=(1 + ￿),
where ￿ is the substitution parameter and ￿ share paremeter in production function.
The technical change is labour-augmenting, ￿L
t , in the balanced growth path.



























where Rt denotes the nominal rental price of capital services and WF
t = (1 + tFP
t +
tFS
t )Wt represents nominal labour costs16. In the steady-state, prices, P(j), are
determined by mark-up, ￿(= ￿ 1
￿z) over the marginal costs
P(j) = ￿MC(j)
The ￿rst order conditions with respect to capital services and labour are given
by
rt ￿ pt = log￿ ￿ log(￿) ￿ ￿log￿K
t + (1 + ￿)(yt ￿ kt)
wF
t ￿ pt = log(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ log(￿) ￿ ￿log￿L
t + (1 + ￿)(yt ￿ lt):
Due to the monopolistic competition in the market for output, the slope of the
demand curve, ￿ ￿ log(￿), enters into both ￿rst order conditions.
The dynamics of the price level Pt(j) of producer j arises from the assumption
that a ￿rm changes its price level when it receives a random ￿price-change signal￿.
A constant probability of receiving a price change signal is given by 1￿￿ (￿ 2 [0;1]).
Since there is continuum of intermediate producers, 1 ￿ ￿ also represents the share
of producers that have received such a signal and, consequently, got an opportunity
to change their prices. The average time between price changes is given by 1=(1￿￿).
Solving the ￿rst order condition and linearizing in a standard way delivers following
aggregate pricing equation for the intermediate goods producer
￿pt = ￿Et￿pt+1 +
(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ ￿￿)
￿
[￿ + mct ￿ pt]:
In￿ ation is determined by the expected in￿ ation and log of markup17 ￿ over the real
marginal costs mct ￿ pt.
14Jalava, Pohjola, Ripatti and Vilmunen (2006) provide evidence that this may be reasonable
approximation for the Finnish post-WWII data.
15See Ripatti and Vilmunen (2001) for further discussion about their properties and estimates





t denote ￿rms pension and social security contributions respectively.
17In a more ￿ exible version of the model we allow for time-varying markup. This, however, does
not play a signi￿cant role in the study of pension issues.
193.12.2 Capital rental ￿rms
Capital is a homogenous factor of production that is owned by a ￿rm that rents
capital to producers of domestic intermediate goods. It operates under perfect com-
petition. Physical capital accumulation generates real adjustment costs in the form
of lost capital stock. Capital accumulation is given by
K
p












t￿1 (1 ￿ ￿K) (3.48)
where S(￿) denotes the adjustment costs of physical capital stock and ￿K is capi-









subject to capital accumulation equation (3.48) and the de￿nition of capital ser-
vices18, Kt = K
p
t￿1. Its momentary pro￿ts are given by
￿K

















t￿1 (1 ￿ ￿K)
￿
The price index of investment goods, PI
t , is the price index of the domestic in-
vestment good retailer and Rt denotes rental rate of capital. The future prof-




t refers to price index of composite con-
sumer goods). The ￿rst order condition with respect to capital stock K
p










































Due to the end-of-period timing of physical capital stock, the accumulated physical
capital is in use in the following period. Hence, it is the expected following period￿ s
rental rate Rt+1 that governs the current period investment decision. Adjustment















Formulation of adjustment costs allow for hump-shaped responses of investments
to various shocks. The usual ￿ investment equation￿can be obtained by substituting
the parametric version of the adjustment costs into the ￿rst order condition.
18For simplicity we assume that capital services obtains a lagged value of physical capital stock. In
a more general case by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004) capital services depends also on the endogenous
utilization rate. This extension does alter the results only in the business cycle frequencies and is,
consequently, beyond the interest of this study.
203.12.3 Production of ￿nal goods
The economy is inhabited by two retailers that produce ￿nal goods (consumer goods
and capital goods) combining domestic intermediate input ￿ produced by the inter-
mediate goods producers ￿ and imported goods and services. They operate under
perfect competition. The demand for the retailers￿output is given by the private
sector￿ s and general government￿ s consumption and investments. The output of the
consumption goods retailer consist of the private consumption, and public purchases
of market goods, CT
t ￿ CH
t + CSF
t . The capital goods retailer face similar demand
by private sector and public sector investments, IT
t ￿ It + IS
t . The production





















; j = I;CT
￿j is respective share parameter, and ￿j respective substitution parameter (￿j =
1=(1 + ￿j). Mj denotes imports and Y j denotes domestic intermediate good. The




t , re￿ ect changes
in the preferences related to domestic and imported intermediate goods.
Cost minimization results following price indices
P
j










































































The consumption goods retailer pays the indirect taxes, tC
t . Hence, the tax base for
indirect taxes consist of private consumption and government purchases. No indirect
taxes are levied on the investment goods.
The elasticity of substitution between imported consumption goods and domestic
intermediate products has been estimated by Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004). Using
the cointegration techniques in the estimation they ￿nd that ^ ￿C = ￿0:7731 (with
standard error 0.049) implying elasticity of substitution 4:4. ￿C has been calibrated
to 0.87. The estimation of the elasticity of substitution between imported investment
goods and domestic intermediate goods suggest a value 2:2, which is given by the
estimate of ^ ￿I = ￿0:538 (with the standard error 0:183). This means that the factors
are gross-substitutes. The calibrated value of the share parameter ￿I is 0:67.
Exporter is a ￿rm that combines domestic intermediate input, Y X
t , and imported
raw materials, MR
t to produce export good, Xt in competitive markets. Technology
and preferences are identical to those of the retailers. Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004)
assume that the imported-raw-materials-augmenting technical change may contain
a deterministic linear time trend. This trend captures the structural change in the
input usage of exports. Estimate for the elasticity of substitution is 0:45, implying
that ￿X = 1:217 (with standard error 0:378): Not surprisingly, the point estimate
21suggest that the imported raw materials and the domestic intermediate input are
gross-complements in the production of exported goods and services. The calibrated
value of the share parameter ￿X is 0:51.
3.12.4 Importing Firms
Imported goods and services are used by the retailers and the exporter in the Aino
economy. They combine imported and domestically produced intermediate goods
to produce ￿nal consumption, capital and exported goods. The consumer goods
and services (including 5 per cent of imported energy) are used by the consumption
goods retailer, capital goods and services are used by the capital goods retailer,
and the exporter uses energy and intermediate goods in producing exported goods.
Each of these retailers operate under perfect competition in their output markets.
A model for import prices of imports by main use, ie for the retailer sector is derived
by following the approach derived by Betts and Devereux (1996) and (2000) applied
to Finnish aggregate import data by Freyst￿tter (2003). A fraction of importers
price their product in local (Finnish) currency and rest of importers in producer (in
their own) currency. Their pricing contains identical frictions in the form of Calvo
(1983b), ie they may change their price only in the case of receiving a random price-
change-signal. Their marginal costs are identical too. The aggregation of the pricing
behaviour over these two types of importers yields an import price Euler equation
where import prices depend on expected future import price in￿ ation, current and
expected future changes in foreign exchange rates and on the real marginal costs of
the importers. This generates incomplete exchange rate pass through in the model.19
3.13 Market Equilibrium
All the markets are in equilibrium at each point of time. The capital goods market
is in the equilibrium if the supply of capital services by the capital rental ￿rm equals
to the demand for capital services by intermediate goods producers. Similarly the
labour markets are in equilibrium when the demand of labour equals its supply
Ls
t = LD
t . In the intermediate goods sector the demand for intermediate goods by
the retailers and exporter equals total supply:
Y C
t + Y I
t + Y X
t = Yt:

















t is the aggregated export price of competing economies and MW
t is ag-
gregate imports of export markets. When market clearing conditions hold, the
workers￿and pensioners￿budget constraints (3.13), (3.21), the general government
19Given that incomplete exchange rate pass through is not essential for the ageing simulations
provided in this paper, we abstract from explicit derivation. Derivation is provided in Ripatti and
Viertola (2004).
22budget constraint (3.39) and pension fund￿ s budget constraint 3.41 imply the fol-
lowing equation for the accumulation of foreign assets20
StAW
t = (1 + rF
t )StAW
t￿1 + PX






t | {z }
trade balance
where the lower line de￿nes trade balance. The current account is given by St(AW
t ￿
AW




4.1 Model￿ s calibration - initial steady state
In order to set up the model ready for demographic simulations and various pol-
icy experiments, we assume that the economy is initially in the steady state: The
economy is growing at balanced growth path and demographic structure remains
unchanged. The model￿ s key parameters are then calibrated such as to re￿ ect the
main features of the Finnish economy. In particular, we adjust the key parameters
such that "great ratios", factor shares, participation rates, demographic structure
as well as ￿scal variables re￿ ect the situation in the Finnish economy on average
during the last 10 years. The parameters of the production functions have been es-
timated using cointegration methods (Johansen 1995), while the parameters related
to the capital stock￿ s adjustment costs, depreciation function and import prices are
estimated using GMM21. Tables (1)- (5) characterize the calibration of some of the
key parameters and resulting values of the key endogenous variables.
In order to ￿t the participation rates observed we have set the relative e¢ ciency of
retirees to be roughly 30%. Intra-temporal elasticity of substitution has been set to
0:8 and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is 0:45: The public-￿nance literature
has a tendency to use value well below unity for the inter-temporal elasticity of
substitution, while the RBC literature prefers large value of ￿: Typically, smaller
values of ￿ makes the economy react more strongly to ￿scal stimulus (table 1).
Re￿ ecting a calibrated value of intra-temporal elasticity of substitution, the value
for the Frisch elasticity of labour supply for the workers is at the range of interna-
tional microeconomic studies, which report the values from 0:15 ￿ 0:32.22 Also,
Kuismanen (2005a, 2005b) has estimated compensated labour supply elasticities
using Finnish Labor Force survey data. Depending on the data sample and the
methods used, his estimates range from 0:08 to 0:30. Distribution of wealth between
working age and elderly seems reasonable in light of the demographic structure: 17
percent of the model economy￿ s total ￿nancial wealth is owned by the retirees. ￿ is
additional factor that multiplies the worker￿ s discount factor. This additional dis-
count factor is clearly higher than for instance those obtained in Gertler (1999). The
di⁄erence is mainly explained by the distorting nature of taxes. Similarly, retirees
marginal propensity to consume is ￿ only￿60% higher than that of the workers.
The transition dynamics of wages and prices are heavily in￿ uenced by the Calvo
parameters. We assume that average expected time of price changes is 5 quarters,
while wages changes occur on average only every 8 quarters. In comparison to
20We have simpli￿ed this by ignoring a transfer account.
21For detailed description of estimation strategies, see Ripatti and Vilmunen (2004).
22Bayomi, Laxton and Pesenti (2004) uses the value 0.33 in the standard calibration of GEM to
Euro area.
23Variable Explanation Value
￿ subjective discount factor, parameter 0:993
v elasticity of period utility with respect to consumption 0:80
￿ Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution, parameter 0:45
￿ Labour e¢ ciency of retirees, parameter 0:30
￿ Relative marginal propensity to consume, variable 1:59
￿ Worker￿ s marginal propensity to consume, variable 0:019
￿F Distribution of ￿nancial asset wealth, variable 0:17
￿ Additional discounting factor 1:10
￿w Frisch elasticity of labour supply (workers), variable 0:26
￿r Frisch elasticity of labour supply (pensioners), variable 0:23
Table 1: Calibration of Key Demand Side Parameters
relevant literature, wage changes occur seldom, but the values re￿ ect the Finnish
centralised wage setting system and the fact that centralised wage contracts are
usually set for 1-2 years time in Finland (table 2). Similarly the Calvo parameter
for prices is on high side.23
Variable Explanation Value
1
￿w Average expected time of wage changes 8:0 Q
1
1￿￿PY Average expected time of price changes 5:1 Q
Table 2: Calibration of Calvo Parameters
Regarding parameters a⁄ecting most strongly to the pension system and demo-
graphic structure, we assume that individuals work on average 43 years and stay in
retirement about 15 years. Annual growth rate of working age population is set to
0:18% per annum (table 3). The steady state retiree worker ratio amounts then to
33 percent, being in accordance with the recent data (60+/15-59). Pension rate has
been calibrated to 0:55, which, given endogenous average wage and demographic
structure means that pension expenditures amounts to 20% percent of wage sum
also roughly in accordance with the recent data. Finally, pension contribution rate
to employees is 3:9 percent, while the employees contribution rate amounts to 15:4
percent. Overall pensio contribution rate thus amounts to 19:3 percent.
Variable Explanation Value
1
1￿￿ Expected time of retirement, in years, parameter 14:8
1
1￿! Expected time of working, in years, parameter 43:1
^ Nw Annual growth rate of working age %, parameter 0:18
’ Old age dependency ratio, variable 0:33
￿WP Pension contribution rate of the workers %, implicit 3:9
￿FP Pension contribution rate of the ￿rms %, parameter 15:4
T R Pensions, % of wage sum, variable 20:5
￿ Pension rate 0:55
Table 3: Calibration of Key Parameters of the Pension System
23Vilmunen (2005) has studied price dynamics in the Finnish economy using a microlevel data
on di⁄erent items in consumer price index. He ￿nds that ￿rms change their prices on average every
quarter.
24Regarding public sector (excluding pension fund) it is assumed that the steady
state debt to output ratio is 60 percent, while total public consumption amounts to
20:8 percent of output (table 4). Total social security transfers to workers are 6:4
percent of output. Finally labour income tax rate is calculated endogenously so as
to satisfy the state￿ s budget constraint, while the rest of the tax parameters have
been set exogenously re￿ ecting the current tax system in Finland. Retirees labour
income tax rate is calibrated to be slightly lower than that of working age. This
captures roughly the fact that the Finnish tax system is highly progressive.
Variable Explanation Value
￿ Fiscal rule adjustment, parameter 0:1
aS Debt (% of output), variable 60:0
￿WS Income tax rate % of workers, implicit 30:2
￿PS Income tax rate % of retirees, implicit :9 ￿ ￿WS
￿K Corporate tax rate %, parameter 19:2
￿C Indirect tax rate %, parameter 21:0
￿FS Firm￿ s social security contribution rate, parameter 4:0
cS Public consumption (% of output), variable 20:8
T SW Total transfers to workers (% of output), variable 6:4
Table 4: Calibration of Key Parameters of the State
Regarding supply side of the economy, we assume that the real interest rate is
about 2:4 percent per annum (table 5). The economy grows at balanced growth path
at the rate of 2:3 percent per annum, re￿ ecting the labour saving technical change
and the steady state growth rate of population. Given small size of Finland in the
Euro area, a feedback from the Finnish economy to euro area level is very modest.
Thus, a reasonable approximation is that the euro area policy rate is exogenous for
the Finnish economy and foreign exchange rates are ￿xed24. Therefore, the model
assumes that ￿St = 0; and foreign nominal interest rate determines the domestic
nominal interest rate up to UIP condition. At balanced growth path, in￿ ation is set
to 2:0%.
Price mark-up and share price to equity ratio are roughly in accordance with
empirical evidence25, while capital share parameter and elasticity of substitution
between capital and labour have been estimated from historical data by Ripatti and
Vilmunen (2001). Fiscal rule adjustment parameter ￿ is in line with other studies
(see for instance Railavo (2002)) and capital depreciation rate is set to 8 % per
annum.
Finally, table (6) summarises "great ratios", factor shares, net foreign asset po-
sition as well as employment rates at initial equilibrium. Comparison to the recent
data shows that the model ￿ts reasonable well to the recent data. The model￿ s cur-
rent calibration however has some di¢ culties to capture relatively low investment
and private consumption share observed in the data.
24In the data we approximate the currency basket St according to export weights of the following
countries: Germany, Italy, UK, USA, Sweden and Japan. See Ripatti and Viertola (2004) for
details.
25Kilponen and Santavirta (2005) estimate from the microdata that a percentage share of oper-
ating pro￿ts to value of gross output in Finnish manufacturing ￿rms has been roughly 8 % during
the last decade.
25Variable Explanation Value
￿ RF= ^ Pc Real interest rate, p.a., variable 2:4
b Y Output growth rate, p.a., variable 2:3
^ ￿L Labour saving technical change p.a., parameter 2:08
￿K Capital depreciation rate, parameter 0:08
￿ Price mark-up, parameter 1:08
￿ AF=￿ ￿ Price to equity ratio, variable 15:0
￿ capital share parameter 0:1
￿ El. of substitution between capital and labour 0:72






cH Private consumption share,% 51:3 54:0
i Private investment rate,% 15:8 18:6
x Export share,% 39:8 34:0
m Import share,% 31:1 34:0
ls Labour share,% 49:5 51:5
k=l Capital intensity 4:8 4:3
aw Net foreign assets, % ￿42:5 ￿23:3
l Employment rate, % 58:6 55:4
lw Workers 56:6 53:8
lr Retirees 2:1 5:2
Shares calculated in nominal terms except for capital intensity
Table 6: Great Ratios, Factor Shares and Participation rates
4.2 Policy experiments
In order to facilitate rather complex general equilibrium e⁄ects associated with aging
and di⁄erent assumption that can be made regarding pension parameters, we design
alternative demographic scenarios and policy experiments. The ￿nancial implica-
tions of ageing population are treated as shocks to the initial state of unchanged
demographic age structure and steady pace of population growth. We performed
￿ve di⁄erent simulations altogether, as given by in table 7.
The shock simulating population ageing incorporated both the higher life ex-
pectancy projected in the population forecast and the slowdown in the growth of
the working-age population. Higher life expectancy was simulated by increasing the
expected period of retirement by 5 years (table 7, column I) and then supplementing
the shock with longer expected working time of 2.5 years, while taking into account
slow down in the growth rate of working age population (table 7, column III). Ex-
periment II is a pure demographic shock. Features inherent in the pension scheme, ie
deferred retirement in response to accelerated accrual and a lower replacement rate,
were built into the demographic e⁄ects by lowering the pension replacement rate by
10 percentage points (column IV). The analysis was completed by an equilibrium
calculation where the replacement rate was endogenously de￿ned while the rate of
employee contribution kept unchanged, at its initial steady state level (column V).
26Table 7: Demographics shocks relative to initial steady state
Experiment
Change I II III IV V
Expected period of retirement, years 5:0 5:0 5:0 5:0 5:0
Growth rate of workers, % annually ￿0:5 ￿0:5 ￿0:5 ￿0:5
Expected working time, years 2:5 2:5 2:5
Pension replacement rate, % -points ￿10:0 ￿*
*endogenous
5 Long-run e⁄ects of ageing
5.1 Increasing life expectancy
Increase in life expectancy projected in the demographic forecast for Finland would
alone have a pronounced e⁄ect on the long-term equilibrium of the economy. Exten-
sion of the period of retirement by ￿ve years, as assumed in the calculation, would
imply an increase in the old-age dependency ratio by 11 percentage points. This
would lead into 6.3% -point increase in pension expenditures per wage sum. Tax
burden on labour would raise over 3.7% -point and be re￿ ected in falling employ-
ment rates. In total contribution rate would go up by 6.7 percentage point. (table
8, column I). Given age cohorts of the same size and a stable fertility rate, higher
life expectancy alone would impose a considerable burden on the economy. The
falling employment rates are attributable to decline in the working-age population
and higher tax burden. Both of these factors are re￿ ected in rising real wages in
the long term. Consumption response, when measured as a share of output re￿ ects
the household￿ s di⁄erent marginal propensities to consume. Retirees own a larger
share of economy￿ s ￿nancial wealth and they are more willing to consume it than
the workers. Mirror e⁄ect of this is that capital share is higher in the aged economy.
5.2 Declining fertility rate
When considering that the age cohorts entering the labour market are smaller than
those withdrawing from it, the old-age dependency ratio would increase by almost 16
percentage points (table 8, column II). Tax rate and employment responses would
also be pronounced, in that the pension contribution rate would increase by 8.8
percentage points and the income tax rate by 3.4 percentage points. The employment
rate would be down almost 6 percentage points re￿ ecting a marked increase in real
wage. Private consumption share would be up by 6.2 percentage points relative to
the initial state of constant population growth. The major increase in tax rates
is not only related to the pension expenditures, but also to the strong response of
workers employment rates. This reduces tax bases, even if retirees respond positively.
Retirees positive labour supply response attributes to longer retirement period and
to the fact that their after tax real wage responds far less than after tax real wage
of workers.
27Table 8: Long Term E⁄ects of Ageing
Final steady-state, change
Variable Explanation I II III IV V
’ Old-age dependency ratio** 10.9 15.5 13.0 13.0 13.9
tP Contribution rate** 6.7 8.8 7.0 1.3 a)0.0
employee 1.4 1.8 1.4 .3 a)0.0
employer 5.4 7.0 5.6 1.0 a)0.0
tWS Labour income tax rate** 2.3 5.0 3.4 0 -0.7
T R
WL Pension expenditure/wage sum** 5.3 8.0 6.7 2.0 1.0
w c)Real wage* 5.4 5.3 6.0 9.5 10.3
(1 ￿ t)w c)After-tax real wage* -0.38 -5.6 -1.6 9.5 11.5
cH Private consumption share* 5.1 6.2 6.4 6.8 13.6
￿ Wealth distribution** 3.4 6.1 5.2 5.5 5.6
l Employment rate** -3.7 -5.7 -4.7 -3.3 -3.0
lw Workers -4.3 -6.2 -5.2 -4.3 -4.2
lr Retirees 2.1 1.8 1.6 3.5 3.7
k Capital share* 21.0 23.5 22.4 21.1 21.0
aw Net foreign assets** 4.8 21.1 27.1 51.2 56.7
￿ Pension replacement rate** 0 0 0 -10.0 b)-12.0
y Output, e¢ ciency units -1.7 -5.5 -3.4 -0.5 0.12
* Percentage change relative to initial steady state
** Change, percentage points relative to initial steady state
a) Contribution rate kept ￿xed at initial steady state, b) endogenous, c) in e¢ ciency units
5.3 Pension reform and lower replacement rate
It has been estimated that the pension reform will extend labour force participation
by an average of 2￿ 3 years. This alone would clearly ease the burden of an ageing
population (table 8, column III). The need to increase the contribution would be
reduced by 1.8 percentage points. Similarly, a need to raise the labour income tax
rate would decrease almost as much when compared to pure demographic shock.
This would, in turn, be re￿ ected in smaller employment losses in the long term.
The decline in the average replacement induced by the rules of pension indexation
also has a considerable e⁄ect on the sustainability of the pension scheme. This
e⁄ect was measured by the assumption that the ratio of average pension to average
wage would decline by 10 percentage points, i.e. clearly less than suggested by the
calculation discussed above. This would considerably lower the need for raising the
contribution rate in response to population ageing in the long term. The labour
income tax rate could be kept at current level, and contribution rates would need
to be raised only by 1.3% -point. (8, column IV). Pension expenditure would raise
4.7 percentage points less when compared to the ￿gure returned by the previous
simulation (column III).
According to the results of the equilibrium calculation based on a rate of con-
tribution we ￿nd that pensions would, in the long term, have to decline from their
current levels by 12% -point in relation to average wages (table 8, column V). This
would ensure that the ratio of pension expenditure would increase only by 1% point
relative to wage sum in response to ageing of the population. However, real wages
would still be increased by 10%, while employment rate would fall by 3 percentage
point. Once more, retirees incentives to work would be improved, primarily because






































Figure 3: Pure demographic shocks and transition.
Blue line corresponds to experiment I and red line (lighter grey) to experiment II.
Periods are quarters.
of the wealth e⁄ect, when compared to previous experiment. Finally output would
remain practically intact in this case.
6 Dynamic e⁄ects
Demographic change generates rather complicated transitional dynamics in the life-
cycle model. Dynamic optimisation and a perfect foresight assumption implies that
the transition paths of the macroeconomic variables re￿ ect the way in which opti-
mising agents prepare for new demographic situation. These adjustment paths are
further complicated by our assumption that demographic structure is changing over
time. The adjustment paths can typically contain over- or undershooting of the for-
ward looking variables, even though the transitional path of the demographic shocks
is a smooth, very slowly evolving process. One such variable is consumption, which
typically makes initially a jump after which it starts adjusting to the new long-run
steady state. This is re￿ ected in over- or undershooting of employment similarly.
Figure ?? shows how the model economy responds to pure anticipated shock to
retirement age (I) and to the shock where fertility rate drops as described in exper-
iment II.26 The dynamic analysis reveals that demographic transition materialises
very slowly and the economy￿ s transition towards new steady state takes decades.
After a temporary drop in distribution of wealth in favour of workers, retirees
eventually hold a larger share of the economy￿ s ￿nancial wealth. The worker￿ s tax
burden on labour follows a similar pattern. Aggregate consumption reacts in advance
26All the simulations were done by DYNARE version 3.051.
29to demographic change and starts stabilising well before the demographic change is
over. Beyond the response of aggregate consumption, there are opposite responses
of retirees and workers. While the workers save for retirement by dropping their
consumption, and also because of higher tax burden, retirees respond positively.
Retirees are also now more numerous as shown by a gradual rise in dependency
ratio. Lower fertility rate in addition to increasing life expectancy gradually in-
creases the dependency ratio and leads into further increase in pension contribution
rate. This e⁄ect is also associated with slightly higher consumption share and lower
employment rate27.
The ￿gure 4 illustrates how extensions of working life and lower replacement rate
alleviates the e⁄ects of a pure demographic shock. Consumption share is practically
intact (red (lighter gray) line), while a need to increase contribution rates gradually
ease along with less pronounced increase in the dependency ratio. Capital share
increases initially more under extension of working life but eventually returns very
close to the same level as with pure demographic shock. Longer working time means
that there is a roughly 1% -point improvement in employment rate when compared
to pure demographic shock. Extending the simulation by taking into account also
a lower pension replacement rate shows that consumption share may now fall in
the short and medium term. A drop in the replacement rate reduces pensioners￿
permanent income, with a subsequent temporary fall in consumption levels. As the
need to raise contribution rate gradually ease, employment improves rather quickly,
while consumption bounces back only after a several decades. Mirroring this, there
is also a temporary fall in capital share and a permanent fall in distribution of wealth
held by the retirees.
6.1 Sensitivity analysis
6.1.1 Subsitution parameters
The results presented are naturally subject to uncertainty regarding calibrated and
estimated parameter values of the model, exogenous assumption on external envi-
ronment of the economy and the demographic projections. In this section, we are
primarily interested in sensitivity of the results with respect to intertemporal sub-
stitution (￿), elasticity of perio utility with respect to consumption (￿), as well as
imperfection of the labour markets. These are the parameters that guide the dy-
namic and long run response of consumption, real wages and employment, which
in turn in￿ uence on that how tax burden on labour evolves as a response to demo-
graphic ageing.
Figure 5 shows how the relationship between tax burden on labour, real wages
and dependency ratio changes along di⁄erent values of intertemporal substitution ￿
when the economy faces a pure demographic shock. A higher value of intertemporal
substitution mitigates the e⁄ects of pure demographic shock on taxes, while the
opposite is true for lower values of ￿: The dynamic path for contribution rate is also
in￿ uenced by the intertemporal substitution parameter. The real wage response is
similarly a⁄ected by di⁄erent values of intertemporal substitution. For high values
of ￿; real wage response is somewhat smoother, but in the long-run real wage hike
27A higher capital share and consumption share in the long run are compatible with Blanchard-
Yaari asset market equilibrium condition. In essence, the condition delivers a positive relationship
between consumption and capital stock as required by the current account balance in an open
economy.












































Figure 4: Extensions of working life and lower replacement rate ease ￿scal burden
of ageing.
Red line (lighter grey) corresponds to experiment III while blue line corresponds to
experiment IV. Baseline is a pure demographic shock. Periods are quarters
is more pronounced, when compared to standard simulation.
Intratemporal substitution a⁄ects primarily on long-run response of the economy
to demographic ageing as well as initial steady state. Sensitivity analysis in ￿gure (6)
shows how higher intratemporal substitution lead into somewhat smaller response of
contribution rate which in turn is associated with slightly smaller negative response
of employment.
6.1.2 Labour market imperfections
The main channel by which pension systems a⁄ect demand for labour is that em-
ployers view pension contributions, particularly in a pure PAYG systems, as a form
of payroll tax. Ceteris paribus, then, the ￿rms substitute labour with capital in-
vestment as tax burden on labour increases. Additional e⁄ect is due to possible
imperfections. When the product markets are non-competitive, as in our model, the
employers can pass the increased burden of their pension contribution to consumers
via product prices. Similarly, when the labour markets are non-competitive, and
employers are obliged to contribute to the pension system, they view such contri-
bution as extra taxes and pass it to nominal wages. Higher nominal wages then
increase the ￿rm￿ s marginal costs fueling also into higher production prices in the
long-run. The ￿nal e⁄ect is that consumption is cut down.
We illustrate this by exploring the sensitivity of benchmark results to the as-
sumption on the level of wage mark-up. In standard simulations, we assumed that
labour markets are competitive in the sense there is no mark-up over marginal rate



































































Figure 5: Pure demographic shock and sensitivity of contribution rate and real wage
on intertemporal substitution parameter




























Dependency ratio v.s. Contribution rate
NU=0.78
NU=0.82




























Dependency ratio v.s. employment rate
NU=0.78
NU=0.82
Figure 6: Pure demographic shock and sensitivity of contribution rate and employ-
ment to intratemporal subsitution.




























Dependency ratio v.s.Contribution rate
W-MU=1
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Dependency ratio v.s. Consumption
W-MU=1
W-MU=1.25
Figure 7: Sensitivity of the contribution rate and private consumption on labour
market imperfections.
Contribution rate and private consumption are here expressed in percentage point
and percentage di⁄erence relative to initial steady state correspondingly. W-MU
refers to wage mark-up.
model to allow for the mark-up is straightforward (see footnote 6). Departing from
an assumption of competitive labour markets yields the result that is summarised
in ￿gure (7). When the labour markets are imperfect in the sense that workers
have pricing power over nominal wages, it turns out that contribution rates need
to raise more, than under perfect competition. This is contrasted with the fact
that relative to the initial steady state, private consumption is lowered more when
the labour markets are imperfect. In comparison to standard simulation, a larger
drop in aggregate consumption increases tax burden on labour and creates an addi-
tional distortion to the economy. General equilibrium response requires that overall
taxation increases along with increased contribution rates.
6.2 Demographic uncertainty
Population scenarios and ageing re￿ ect projected changes in fertility rates and
longevity. These population scenarios are however subject to much uncertainty.
OECD (2005) has reported that in the case of Finland, overall uncertainty sur-
rounding longevity and fertility rate projections suggests that the dependency ratio
will ￿ uctuate ￿10 percentage points around the o¢ cial scenario.28 Rather similar
results were obtained in the project "Uncertain Population of Europe" (UPE) funded
by the EU Commission. In this project, stochastic population forecasts were gen-
erated by simulating 3,000 alternative paths of future development for age-speci￿c
28Assessing the robustness of demographic projections in OECD countries, Frederic Gonand,
Economics Deparment Working Papers, No. 464, OECD)
33mortality, fertility and net migration for di⁄erent European countries. These dif-
ferent scenarios were then combined into a population scenarios using the classical
cohort-component book-keeping equations. Based on the resulting age speci￿c co-
hort tables from di⁄erent simulations, the table 9 summarises some statics related to
old-age dependency ratio. This helps us to anchor the degree of uncertainty related
to old-age dependency ratio in Finland and thus quantify the degree of uncertainty
related to demographic structure. The table suggests that risks in making large
errors in population forecasts increase after 2020, making the con￿dence limits grow
rather fast (see also Alho (1998)). By 2050 the standard error suggest that 90%
con￿dence intervals are (0:51;0:83); suggesting a rather large uncertainty bounds
around the mean projection.
Year Min Mean Max S.E.
2010 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.005
2020 0.48 0.54 0.61 0.019
2030 0.49 0.64 0.74 0.043
2040 0.41 0.65 0.94 0.071
2050 0.36 0.67 1.08 0.099
Table 9: Summary statistics from stochastic population simulations (based on own
calculations from http://www.stat.￿/tup/euupe/ )
In order to analyse the demographic uncertainty in the model, we take take the
experiment III as a baseline (see table 7), but allow stochastic variation in retirement
probability (!t), survival probablity (￿t) and worker￿ s growth rate ^ Nt. Allowing for
stochastic variation around the deterministic trends in these variables generates de-
terministic paths, combined with stochastic variation, for the model￿ s endogenous
variables29. We are not able to generate the magnitudes of the uncertainty reported
in table 9, as those would require implausibly large standard errors for the demo-
graphic shocks.
Nevertheless, table 10 summarises the results for the model￿ s selected variables
when the uncertainty on retirement rate, survival probability and worker￿ s growth
rate is calibrated such that to generate a standard error of 0:04 for the old-age
dependency ratio30. The table however points to a sizeable uncertainty on economic
outcomes of the model, once uncertainty on demographic stucture is accounted for.
Stochastic simulations allows us also to quantify the relative importance of dif-
ferent demographic shocks to economic outcomes. This can be done by looking at
(asymptotic) variance decomposition as generated by the stochastic simulations of
the model. Although the results from variance decomposition depends on the as-
sumed standard errors of the shocks, columns 5-7 in table 10 clearly suggest that
lengthening the working time has rather minor impact on alleviating the ￿scal bur-
den of ageing: Only 6 percent of the stochastic variation in the contribution rate
is explained by the variation in working period. Stochastic variation in worker￿ s
growth rate, and thus in fertility rate is clearly much more important.
29DYNARE￿ s functions forecast and stoch_simul allow to mix deterministic and stochastic
shocks.We are indebted to Michel Juillard for developing these functions.
30Stochastic assumptions about retirement probability and survival probability imply that ex-
pected working period has a standard error of 5.5 years while the retirement period has a standard






! ￿ ^ NW
t
’ Dependency ratio 0.48 0.044 3.5 17.9 78.6
tP Contribution rate 0.29 0.025 6.0 31.3 62.8
tWS Labour income tax rate 0.37 0.023 4.7 25.1 70.2
T R
WL Pension exp/wage sum 0.29 0.023 3.2 16.3 80.5
y Output, e¢ ciency units 0.19 0.007 5.1 26.9 68.1
L=N Employment rate 0.49 0.016 3.8 20.1 76.1
! Retirement probability 0.9942 0.0007
￿ Survival probability 0.9871 0.0035
^ NW
t Growth rate of workers 0.9992 0.0037
a) All the moments are evaluated at ￿nal steady state
Table 10: Asymptotic moments from stochastic model simulations for selected
model￿ s variables
7 Conclusions
Sensitivity analyses show that tax e⁄ects may easily be over or underestimated when
considering the general equilibrium e⁄ects of ageing in the life cycle model. This is
especially related to the assumptions on inter-temporal elasticity of consumption ie
consumers￿willingness to adjust consumption behaviour over time and assumptions
that can be made about possible imperfections in the labour markets. Lower values
of inter-temporal substitution lead into a stronger tax responses of the economy to
ageing. Similarly, if labour market imperfections are important, ageing will have
more pronounced e⁄ects in terms of tax burden on labour and consumption. By
contrast, changes in periodic utility of consumption involves clearly less uncertainty
in these analyses. The uncertainty inherent in demographic forecasts themselves
becomes also signi￿cant when the time horizon of the analysis extends far into the
future.
These uncertainties notwithstanding, the analysis highlights the key role played
by taxation in the assessment of the costs of an ageing population. When the re-
sponses of labour supply, wages and hence private consumption to higher taxation
are consistently accounted for, the economy will, in the long term, settle at a level of
taxation clearly above that generally estimated in mechanical sustainability calcu-
lations. It should be noted that even if the e⁄ective retirement age were to increase
as expected, the burden from pension payments alone would cause the tax rate to
rise to a level above that witnessed in the worst years of recession in the mid-1990s.
In the light of the model calculations, the e¢ ciency losses induced by demographic
change thus appear considerable.
Taxation will increase especially under the assumption that the real value of
pensions remains unchanged relative to wage developments. If the replacement rate
falls, as seems likely under the current pension regime, there would be a much smaller
increase in taxation in response to growing expenditure on pensions. The average
decline in the level of pensions relative to wage developments, in turn, raises several
concerns.
In Finland where supplementary pension funds are of minor importance by in-
ternational comparison there is a risk that the falling purchasing power of pensions
35relative to wage developments will exert pressure on other social security schemes.
The employee pension scheme, which appears to be ￿nancially sustainable, may thus,
in practice, generate costs to local and central government in the form of higher ex-
penditure on income support and other bene￿ts. Voluntary provision for retirement
is also likely to step up.
Another concern is related to the measures necessary for preparing for a slower
growth rate for pensions relative to general earnings growth. The pension reform
debate has focused strongly on the accelerated rate of accrual applied to newly
awarded pensions, which encourages workers to remain longer in the labour force.
One would think, however, that indexation of pensions alone would provide an in-
centive to longer working life, considering that it will reduce pensioners￿relative
standard of living, especially in later life. Furthermore, the stochastic simulations
suggest that lengthening the working time has rather minor impact on alleviating
the ￿scal burden of ageing: Only a minor fraction of the stochastic variation in the
contribution rate is explained by the variation in the length of working time. A
variation in worker￿ s growth rate, and thus in fertility rate, is clearly much more
important. These concerns and results suggest that the debate over pensions and
ageing should be broadened to consider economic policy issues wider than those
raised by the mechanical sustainability calculations.
?
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38A Appendices
A.1 Calculating pension replacement ratio
While there are good reasons to argue approximate one-to-one interdependency be-
tween average wage and average pension bene￿ts only for those retiring over a par-
ticular period, the level of pensions for those who have already retired is not directly
in￿ uenced by wage developments. This complicates projections for aggregate pen-
sion spending. For already retired population, if labour productivity grows, pension
levels will grow at a slower pace than wages since the wage weight in the pension
index is only 0.2. Therefore, in order to trace aggregate pension expenditure we
split the population of pensioners into two groups: number of new pensioners in the
period under consideration (workers exiting workforce) and number of those retired
earlier.
This led us to a recursive equation for pension expenditure where, at the start-
ing point, the number of new pensioners is same as the size of the age cohort we
assume to have exited the workforce and taken retirement. This increases each year
cumulatively with the size of the population in the age cohort taking into account
the assumed mortality in this growing number of pensioners.
The number of old pensioners decreases as age cohorts assumed to have retired
before die out. The following chart (8), where we assume exit age of 60 years,
indicates that when 2004 is taken as the starting point, the original old pensioners
will have disappeared by the start of 2040s.
Average replacement ratio was then constructed as follows. First, average pen-
sion of those pensioners retired before year 2004 (old pensioners) was determined
simply by the pension level at the starting point adjusted by changes in the pension
index. Second, the average pension of those retiring later (new pensioners) con-
stitutes of two components: pensions of those retiring in the year considered and
pensions of those new pensioners who had retired earlier. The replacement rate of
those retiring each year is assumed to remain unchanged in relation to average wage
(66 per cent, the ratio prevailed in 2003) except that it was adjusted with the life
expectancy rate starting from year 2009. Pension of those retired earlier is adjusted
with pension index. These three type of average pension indicators were weighted
together by sizes of relevant age cohorts.
In the following chart, (9) the pension-wage ratios are calculated by assuming
that in￿ ation rate is 2 %, productivity growth (=real wage growth) 1.75 % and
the number of those retiring each year same as the number of 60-years-olds. This
together with unfavourable pension indexation and decreasing life expectancy rate
will lower the pension-wage ratio in a considerable amount. In aggregate, pension-
wage-ratio would decrease from the current level of about 60 per cent to about 40












2003 2008 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043 2048
New pensioners Old pensioners
Source: Population prognosis of Statistics Finland, 2004
Number of pensioners










2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
All pensioners Those retired before year 2004 Those retired after 2004
Source: Statistics Finland and Bank of Finland calculations
Pension-wage ratios
Figure 9: Projections for average pension-wage ratios
40